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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an overview of what economists can say about vertical constraints by 
multi-sided platforms at this stage in the development of our knowledge about the economics of 
these businesses. It describes the general procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of vertical 
restraints by multi-sided platforms. It then focuses on the role of critical mass for multi-sided 
platforms and how vertical restraints might be used on the one hand, anti-competitively to prevent 
rivals from achieving critical mass and long-term growth and, on the other hand, pro-competitively, 
to ensure the platform and its customers that the platform will remain viable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Some firms enter into agreements with their customers that limit their ability to buy from 
rivals of the firms. These agreements are called “vertical restraints.”  They include exclusive-dealing 
contracts, tying and bundling, conditional rebates, and meeting competition clauses. There is an 
extensive literature on how these restraints could increase economic efficiency, on the one hand, and 
how they could harm competition and consumers, on the other hand.1 Vertical restraints are also the 
subject of a considerable body of decisions by courts and competition authorities.2  
This paper is about the use of vertical restraints by a particular kind of business known as a 
multi-sided platform.3 Multi-sided platforms create value by serving as intermediaries between two 
or more types of customers where one type of customer can realize value by interacting with another 
type of customer. The demand by one type of customer depends on the participation on the 
platform of one or more of the other types of customers.4 
There are three main reasons for a focused analysis of vertical restraints by multi-sided 
platforms.  First, certain features of these platforms raise special issues for the analysis of the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of vertical restraints. Second, these platforms include an 
economically significant group of businesses including shopping malls, payments systems, software 
platforms, exchanges, dating venues, various types of media including radio, television, newspapers, 
and online businesses including search engines, social networks, and ecommerce. Third, multi-sided 
platforms are frequently under investigation for their use of vertical restraints; several important 
decisions have found that multi-sided platforms engaged in the anticompetitive use of vertical 
restraints.5 
  The literature on multi-sided platforms is relatively new.6 It is related to an older literature 
on network industries that recognized the importance of direct and indirect network externalities in 
firm and competitive dynamics.  The multi-sided platform literature has developed behavioral 
models for firms with interdependent demand that build on the earlier work on network effects. It 
has also shown that indirect network effects are important for many industries such as shopping 
 
1 See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 302-410 (2004). 
2 See PHILIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
AND THEIR APPLICATION Chapters 16-18 (2012); KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMMON LAW 252-310 (2003). 
3 For a survey of this literature as it relates to antitrust see David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The 
Antitrust Analysis of Multi-sided Platform Businesses, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS (Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol eds., forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185373.  
4 Id. 
5 See, for example, European Commission, Decision of 24 May 2004 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement Against Microsoft Corporation (Case COM/C-
3/37.792 – Microsoft), Official Journal L 032, 06/02.2007 P. 0023-0028. 
6 See Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Triole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 
990 (2003). This paper started circulating in draft firm around 2000.  
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malls and exchanges that were not considered by the network effects literature. Some of the issues 
discussed in this paper were presaged in the network industry literature, particularly the possible role 
of exclusive dealing in foreclosing entrants, but the multi-sided platform literature provides a richer 
and more nuanced treatment of these topics. 7  
This paper presents an overview of what economists can say about vertical constraints by 
multi-sided platforms at this stage in the development of our knowledge about these businesses.8 
Section I describes several key features of multi-sided platforms that are helpful for analyzing the use 
of vertical constraints by these platforms. Section II explains how vertical restraints can help 
platforms achieve efficiencies that improve consumer welfare. Section III reviews possible 
anticompetitive vertical restraints in light of the traditional economic literature on vertical restraints 
and the more recent literature on the use of vertical restraints by multi-sided platforms. Section IV 
focuses on the key anticompetitive concern arising from the new literature on multi-sided platforms 
and the older literature on network effects: the use of vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing to 
prevent rival platforms, particularly entrants, from achieving the critical mass necessary for being 
viable platforms. Section V concludes with recommendations for how competition analysis should 
deal with vertical restraints given our current state of knowledge. 
I. INTERDEPENDENT DEMAND AND EXTERNALITIES 
 
Each type of customer for a multi-sided platform is referred to as a “side” of the platform. 
Multi-sided platforms facilitate interactions between members of each side. They do this by 
providing mechanisms that facilitate search, matching, and exchange. For example, financial 
exchange platforms provide mechanisms for helping traders search for trading opportunities, 
matching potential trading partners, and consummating transactions.  Those interactions result in 
the creation of value.  In some cases, such as dating venues, the platform simply gets the parties 
together and they decide whether there is a mutually advantageous exchange. In other cases, such as 
advertising-supported media, the platform subsidizes one side by providing valuable services to 
make members of that side available to the other side. 
 
A. EXTERNALITIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
Multi-sided platforms typically have positive indirect network externalities that lead to 
positive feedback effects between the sides.  Each member on one side can expect to realize more 
value if there are more members on the other side.  That is because they have a higher likelihood of 
finding a trading partner and with more trading partners the expected value of the trade is higher as 
 
7 There is, however, an important related literature concerning exclusivity arrangements in networks. See David 
Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999); Carl 
Shapiro. Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673 (1999). 
8 There are likely specific issues relevant to an analysis of vertical restraints in any particular multi-sided 
industry or company that will not be reflected in this overview. Among other reasons, this overview largely reflects 
the multi-sided vertical restraints literature to date, which is a relatively new and developing literature. 
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well.  There is also a positive indirect externality in use between two trading partners.  Each benefits 
if the other agrees to trade.9  These positive indirect externalities result in the linkage demand 
schedules for the various sides.  The demand by one side depends on the participation of the other 
sides and vice versa. The demand schedules for the sides of multi-sided platforms are therefore 
interdependent. Multi-sided platforms also have positive direct network effects at least to a degree.  
Having more members on the same side attracts more members on the other side. 
While positive indirect network externalities are the main reason multi-sided platforms create 
value these platforms often also have to deal with direct and indirect negative externalities. Negative 
direct externalities can arise from congestion (too many people at the mall), competition (at some 
point competition with other members outweighs their value of their attracting members to the 
other side), or bad behavior (nightclub brawls).  Negative indirect externalities can arise because 
members on one side impose costs on members of the other side by behaving badly (hate speech on 
social networks), undersupplying or distorting information (selling practices on commerce sites), 
creating congestion (too many traders overloads electronic trading platforms), or otherwise reducing 
the value of the platform to the detriment of its members.       
Multi-sided platforms create value for their participants, and profit for themselves, by 
managing these externalities.  They can increase indirect network externalities, of course, by securing 
more members on each side of the platform. But, in addition, for a given number of members they 
can increase the value of the platform by increasing the amount of positive externalities among 
members and decreasing the amount of negative externalities.  Multi-sided platforms have a number 
of instruments available for maximizing the value of the platform in addition to price. These include 
design choices, product offerings and the design and enforcement of rules and standards.  Some of 
these instruments involve vertical restraints as discussed below. 
As a result of positive indirect network externalities the entrepreneurs who start multi-sided 
platforms have to solve significant coordination problems to create an economically viable platform 
and one that can rely on positive feedback effects for growth. The platform must have enough 
members of each side on board to create a situation in which a member realize enough value to 
participate in the platform and the platform can charge enough to operate profitably.  Solving this 
conundrum is one of the key challenges these entrepreneurs face. 
 
B. CRITICAL MASS AND GROWTH 
Multi-sided platforms face a dynamic growth problem.10   To be viable platforms need to 
achieve “critical mass” which involves a sufficient number of members of both sides to create 
enough value to attract more members of each side.  Once a platform achieves critical mass indirect 
network externalities enable it to grow by attracting more members. That is, once a platform reaches 
critical mass, it “ignites” in the sense that it is propelled forward by its own momentum from 
 
9 See Rochet and Tirole, supra note 6.  
10 See David S. Evans, How Catalysts Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based Start-Ups, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS, AND 
INNOVATION (Annabelle Gawer, ed., 2009); David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in 
Platform Businesses, 9 REV. NETWORK ECON. (2010). Earlier literature on direct and indirect network effects alluded to 
critical mass but did not provide any formal definition of analysis of it. 
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positive-feedback effects. If a platform has not achieved critical mass then members who have 
joined it tend to stop participating because it does not provide enough value and new members do 
not join because they do not realize enough value either.  In this case the platform “implodes” 
through a process in which positive feedback effects work in reverse: as members of one side stop 
participating, the value to members of the other side falls and some of them stop participating, 
which leads to more members of the first side to stop participating.  
As a practical matter, platforms achieve critical mass through getting customers who like to 
try new things (“early-adopters”), customers with especially high values for participating in the 
platform, and customers who expect that the platform will obtain critical mass and are therefore 
willing to make the investment to join. If they can keep the interest of these initial customers, and 
get them to through increasing growth they can reach critical mass and ignite.  If they cannot then 
they implode.11 In some cases, platforms can start with critical mass by securing enough customer 
relationships before they launch.12  In other cases they can move sequentially by attracting customers 
on one side (using content to attract viewers) and then when they have enough of those customers 
making them available to customers on the other side (advertisers). 
Figure 1 shows the basic concept of critical mass and ignition for a two-sided platform with 
sides A and B and for a common case in practice.  There is minimal numbers of customers, shown 
on C’-C”, that, if achieved, provides a “thick enough market” or a sufficiently “liquid” market to 
permit sustainable growth. Once a platform achieves critical mass, by being at a point on C’-C”, for 
example, it can grow to its profit-maximizing potential of D*; if it does not achieve critical mass on 
the segment C’-C’’ it contracts and ultimately fails. The optimal growth path to critical mass and to 
long-run equilibrium is well away from the horizontal and vertical axes in most plausible cases.13 
Relatively balanced growth is necessary. This is reflected in Figure 1 in that the equilibrium growth 
path to critical mass must occur within the triangle 0-C’-C”. Having too many of one side and too 
few of another side will cause implosion. 
 
11 See Evans, supra note 10, for further discussion. 
12 For example, when the Discover Card launched in 1986 it used the base of Sears store cardholders to secure 
customers on the card side and had the Discover Card accepted at Sears stores in addition to signing up many merchants 
to accept it at its launch as well. See DAVID S. EVANS AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING (2006).  
13 See Evans and Schmalensee, supra note 10. 
Figure 1: Catalytic Ignition and Critical Mass 
Side A 
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New multi-sided platforms must engage in a variety of tactics to move from an initial 
situation of having no consumers to a point of critical mass from which the business can grow 
through positive feedback effects.  In doing so they often must shape the expectations of potential 
members.  To incur the costs of joining and participating in the platform members of each side must 
expect that there will be enough members of other sides to make it worth their while.  Vertical 
agreements play at role in shaping those expectations. 
Achieving critical mass is a difficult business problem that multi-sided businesses face that 
single-sided ones do not.  The vast number of successful multi-sided businesses, however, 
demonstrates that ignition is a solvable problem. Moreover, the fact that many multi-sided industries 
support several viable platforms, and have experienced entry, demonstrates that the success of a first 
mover at ignition does not prevent followers from achieving critical mass either.14  In some 
industries, the critical mass needed is relatively low as a proportion of total industry output.    
 
C. MULTI-HOMING 
 
The competitive dynamics of multi-sided platforms depend in theory and in practice on the 
number of platforms that a customer on each side uses, on differences between the sides in the 
number of platforms used, and on the ability of a customer on one side to dictate the choice of 
platform for the other side. A customer “single homes” if she uses only one platform in a particular 
industry and “multihomes if she uses several.15  
Armstrong analyzed the role of “multi-homing” in platform competition.  Suppose 
platforms in some market create value by having agents of Type A and Type B as members.  If Type 
A agents only join one platform, then Type B agents can only gain access to Type A agents by 
joining that same platform. When there is single-homing on one side and multi-homing on the other 
side in his model, Armstrong shows that platforms have incentives to compete aggressively for the 
single-homing customer who will therefore pay low prices.  With these customers on board the 
platform will then earn its profits from the customers who multi-home on the other side.  
Armstrong referred to the single-homing side as a “competitive bottleneck” in this situation. 
Sometimes multi-homing customers on one side can dictate the choice of platform to agents 
on the other side of the market. For example, most consumers use multiple payment methods and 
even use multiple payment cards and most merchants accept all of these payment alternatives. In 
practice, one can argue that the consumer dictates which payment system is used.  The consumer 
generally presents one particular payment method at checkout out of the choices the merchant has 
made available. For the purposes of that transaction the consumer single-homes and, by the same 
logic as above, the platform has an incentive to compete aggressively for the consumer to use their 
 
14 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987341. 
15 See Rochet and Tirole, supra note 6. 
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payment method.16   
It is not clear how robust the “competitive bottleneck” argument is, however.  In software 
platforms, for instance, the price structure is the opposite of what the competitive bottlenecks 
theory would predict.  Most personal computer users rely on a single software platform, while most 
developers write for multiple platforms.17  Yet personal computer software providers generally make 
their platforms available for free, or at low cost to applications developers and earn profits from the 
single-homing user side. 
Nevertheless, platforms face a challenge in securing critical mass when customers single 
home.  To reach critical mass entrants have to rely on attracting customers that have not yet 
committed to a platform or on persuading customers of other platforms to switch. Entry may, 
therefore, be challenging in mature platform industries where most consumers have committed to a 
platform and in situations in which there are significant platform switching costs. 
 
D. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
Multi-sided platforms can engage in horizontal and vertical product differentiation. For one-
sided firms, horizontal and vertical differentiation locates the firm near a pool of potential customers 
and helps determine pricing.  For multi-sided platforms, by determining the customers on one side, 
horizontal and vertical differentiation affects demand on the other side.  Because of these 
interdependencies, a platform must make differentiation decisions jointly for all of the sides it 
serves.  Moreover, the selection of customers on one side is one possible way to differentiate the 
platform horizontally or vertically.  
A shopping mall developer, for example, must decide on a number of different product 
attributes such as location, size, parking, and quality of construction. But it also needs to decide what 
kind of stores and customers it wants to attract. Those are obviously interdependent. It could be an 
upscale mall and only rent space to merchants with an upscale clientele. If it succeeds in attracting 
enough such merchants it will tend to attract an upscale clientele.  In order to do this, of course, it is 
likely to make other decisions—such as locating close to wealthy towns and using better finishes—
that helps attract wealthy customers and merchants they tend to patronize.18 Product differentiation, 
as this example suggests, is a tactic that firms can use to create value by making it easier for agents to 
find counterparties for value-increasing exchange.  The upscale mall, for example, makes it easier for 
shoppers to find stores that serve their tastes and easier for stores to find customers. Platforms can 
also create value for agents on one side by limiting how much competition they face for a match.19 
 
16 See Özlem Bedre-Defolie and Emilio Calvano, Pricing Payment Cards (European School of Management and 
Technology and Bocconi University, Working Paper, 2012). 
17 DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU, AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE ENGINES: HOW SOFTWARE 
PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006).  
18 Andrea Galeotti and José Moraga-González, Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products, 53 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 417 (2009) provide a model of a shopping mall that attracts horizontally differentiated retailers as well as 
consumers. 
19 Hanna Halaburda and Miko aj Jan Piskorski, Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms (Harvard 
Business School, Working Paper No. 10-098, 2011).    
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Product differentiation is a key reason why many industries with multi-sided platforms have 
multiple competitors even though indirect network effects and sometimes economies of scale would 
seem to propel them to monopolies.20  Job placement provides an interesting example. The online 
portion of this industry consists of job boards that help match job searchers with employers through 
online postings and search.  In the U.S. there are two large job boards that cover many different job 
categories. But then there are hundreds of other job boards that specialize in different job segments 
such as professionals (LinkedIn.com) and media jobs (mediabistro.com).  By specializing, these job 
boards presumably increase matching efficiency. Beyond the job boards there are recruiting services 
that work for employers or employees.  The result is a highly fragmented industry of two-sided 
platforms. 
II. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND PLATFORM VALUE   
Platforms create value by making the exchange of pecuniary and non-pecuniary value more 
efficient. They do that typically by reducing the transactions costs for the members of the various 
sides of the platforms. The creation and distribution of that value are intertwined.21  The platform 
owner can distribute the value created between the two sides, and thereby determine the consumer 
surplus each receives and to itself as profit.  The distribution of value between the sides determines 
the extent to which the platform attracts participants on those sides. Platform owners may subsidize 
some sides—in the sense of providing marginal value at below marginal costs—to secure their 
participation. 
The value created by the platform, and the overall consumer surplus distributed to the 
members of the multiple sides, depends in part on the platform’s success in increasing positive 
externalities and reducing negative externalities.  Moreover, the platform can create consumer 
surplus on a sustainable basis only if it reaches critical mass. 
Vertical restraints can play assist in this sustainable value creation. 22 To explain how we 
consider a two-sided platform consisting of sides A and B. The same considerations apply to 
platforms with more than two sides. 
 
A. PROCOMPETITIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS BY MULTI-SIDED PLATFROMS 
 
There are three broad categories of procompetitive explanations for vertical restraints that 
apply to multi-sided platforms.23 First, vertical restraints help platforms achieve a natural monopoly 
 
20 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987341. 
21 To use economic parlance, they are determined endogenously. 
22 Of course, one would need to examine the facts of the particular case to assess whether these procompetitive 
benefits of vertical restraints exist and whether they outweigh possible anticompetitive effects.  As is the case with 
vertical restraints generally there may be arguments as to why some vertical restraints should be presumed 
procompetitive and therefore treated as per se lawful.  
23 In addition, the traditional explanations that have been advanced in the literature and case law for vertical 
restraints as to why vertical restraints may be procompetitive generally apply to multi-sided platforms as well. See, e.g.,  
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that provides the largest benefits to consumers overall.  Second, vertical restraints help platforms 
deal with expectation and coordination problems that result in welfare gains for platform users. 
Third, vertical restraints on one side of the platform benefit the other side of the platform and 
increase consumer welfare overall.  
 1. Natural Platform Monopolies  
 
As a result of indirect network effects, customers on side A realize greater value when there 
are more customers on side B and customers on side B realize greater value when there are more 
customers on side A.  There are some circumstances in which these positive feedback effects could 
imply that it would be socially optimal to have a single platform. That is, the industry served by the 
platform is natural monopoly.24 That could occur if there are no diseconomies of scale on the cost 
side, no congestion effects on the demand side, and homogeneous consumers on both sides so that 
there is not optimal to have differentiated platforms.  The monopoly platform could maximize the 
value for consumers if the benefits of positive feedback effects outweigh higher prices resulting 
from the exercise of market power.25 Vertical restraints that provide incentives for customers to 
consolidate demand on a single platform could therefore increase consumer welfare in this 
situation.26 
This same argument applies even if there is not a natural monopoly.  Vertical restraints could 
be used to help consolidate demand in a few possibly differentiated platforms.  The general point is 
that with positive indirect effects there are gains at least up to a point in having customers on board 
the same platform.  
 
 2. Demand Coordination, Expectations, and Vertical Restraints 
 
There are other possible procompetitive benefits of vertical restraints that do not hinge on 
the argument that consolidating demand increases consumer welfare. Vertical restraints can ensure 
the platform will have enough participation by members of side A to exceed critical mass and to 
 
DENNIS W. CARLTON AND JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 396-412 (4th ed. 2005); 
MASSIMO MOTTA, supra note 1, at 306-347; Damien Geradin and Caio Mario da Silva Pereira Neto, For a Rigorous “Effects-
Based” Analysis of Vertical Restraints Adopted by Dominant Firms: An Analysis of the EU and Brazilian Competition Law 11-16 
(Tilburg University and Getulio Vargas Foundation, Working Paper, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2173735. 
24 The traditional case of natural monopoly arises as a result of scale economies in cost. In this case the natural 
monopoly arises as a result of interdependent demand that result in the value of the platform to users being maximized 
when all users participate in the same platform.  It is economically efficient to have a single platform— that is, there is a 
natural monopoly—so long as diseconomies of scale in costs do not outweigh the benefits of consolidating demand. 
25 Or alternatively if the single platform can be regulated so that the benefits of having a single platform outweigh 
the direct and indirect costs of regulating it compared with having multiple competing platforms. 
26 During the development of the industry platforms would compete on the terms of the vertical restraints and 
through this process of competition the most efficient platform would win the market. Once a platform has dominated 
an industry it may still need to maintain vertical restraints to prevent rivals platforms from attracting selected users and 
thereby reducing the overall welfare that the platforms can deliver. 
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grow through positive feedback effects.  This provides value to the platform participants on all sides. 
They obtain some assurance that their investments in joining and participating in the platform will 
provide a return. The vertical restraints reduce the risk that the platform will implode.  By increasing 
participation rates vertical restraints also increase the expected value of the gain from trade on the 
platform. They, in effect, assure a greater supply of liquidity—potential partners with whom to enter 
into a value-increasing exchange—to platform participants.  These assurances help the platform 
solve its fundamental coordination problem.  The platform can only secure participation of 
members it they expect that members of the opposing side will participate as well. 
We can see the procompetitive value of the vertical restraints providing this value by 
considering the but-for world in which the platform cannot avail itself of these restraints.  New 
platforms might not be able to reach critical mass without securing commitments that customers on 
one side will only be able to interact with customers on the other side through their platform.  
Moreover platforms that have exceeded critical mass might invest less in the platform, and possibly 
not be willing to operate the platform, if they face a risk that a reduction in participation on one side 
could, through reverse positive feedback effects, result in a downward spiral for the platform.  
Platform participants would ultimately lose in these situations because the platform would either not 
be available at all to them or it would be a smaller platform offering less value. 
 
 3. Vertical Restraints and Indirect Externalities   
  
Vertical restraints on side A can also result in benefits to side B.  Although these restraints 
may decrease the welfare of side A participants in the first instance they could increase the welfare 
of side B participants and ultimately also increase the welfare of side A participants as a result of 
positive feedback effects. The platform may be able to increase value by ensuring participants on 
side B that when they interact with participants on side B that side B participants will provide 
particular products and services of specified quality, will make the terms of trade transparent, will 
not act opportunistically, and will not engage of other forms of behavior that could harm members 
of side B. Some of the restrictions on participants on side B could entail vertical restraints (tying for 
example) or could be interpreted as possible vertical restraints (no surcharge rules for example).  
 
B. ANALYSIS OF TYPICAL VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
We now consider specific vertical restraints and consider their possible procompetitive 
benefits in light of these three considerations. 
 
 1. Exclusive Dealing 
 
Exclusive dealing contracts limit the ability of customers to purchase from other firms.  The 
usual procompetitive justifications for these contracts apply to multi-sided platforms. 
These contracts increase the certainty of demand. That then reduces the risk for the firm and 
increases its ability to engage in resource planning that will benefit all customers. For example, a 
11 
shopping mall developer would incur risk if the anchor store, which occupies a large space in the 
mall, could have a nearby standalone store or an anchor store at a competing nearby mall. 
Exclusive dealing contacts might enable the firm to make sunk-cost investments that benefit 
the customer without facing the risk that the customer will opportunistically refuse to bear the costs 
of these investments after they have been made.  For example, a financial exchange platform might 
invest in creating a trading platform for a new class of securities. It may want large traders to 
commit exclusively to the platform before incurring those costs to avoid ex-post opportunistic 
haggling.  
These contracts also prevent free riding whereby customers receive services from the firm 
but then purchase from another firm at a lower price made possible because that other firm does 
not provide those services.  For example, an ecommerce platform could provide services to connect 
a buyer and seller for a mutually advantageous transaction but the parties might try to consummate 
the trade off of the platform and thereby avoid the transaction fees. 
The existence of indirect positive externalities between sides provides additional ways in 
which exclusive dealing contracts could increase the efficiency of multi-sided platforms.  As noted 
earlier a platform can increase the value it provides to its customers on one side by enabling them to 
interact with more customers on the other side.  In theory, competition among platforms could 
result in the consolidation of demand on the most efficient platform. In practice there could be a 
coordination problem.  Customers would benefit if more of them moved to a common platform. 
But they do not consolidate their demands perhaps because of switching costs or asymmetric 
information.   A platform—particularly the more efficient one—could help solve this coordination 
problem by entering it contract that requires different groups of customers to consolidate their 
demands.     
These exclusive dealing contracts could be particularly helpful in increasing efficiency when 
customers on side engage in single homing.  Customers on the other side incur pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs accesses these single homing customers across several platforms and may not realize 
the benefits of having a thick enough market on any one platform.  By consolidating these 
customers through exclusive deals the platform could generate additional value that could benefit 
itself as well as the customers on all sides. 
Exclusive dealing contracts with customers on one side (A) also provide potentially valuable 
guarantees to customers on the other sides (B for example).  The side B customers know that they 
will be able to access side A customers if they use side B.  Such guarantees would be more valuable 
the more side B customers have to incur sunk costs in joining the platform.   
Finally, exclusive dealing contracts could also help ensure the platform as well as its 
customers on both sides that the platform will achieve critical mass and be in a position to grow.  
This increased certainty for the platform also makes its entrepreneur and investors more willing to 
invest in the platform.  For example, video game console companies may enter into exclusive deals 
with developers to help ensure that they will have both a supply of games and game users who 
cannot get the game elsewhere.27   
 
27 For a discussion of commitment issues for video game platforms see Andrei Hagiu, Pricing and Commitment by Two-
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 2. Bundled Rebates, Meeting Competition, and other Price Restraints  
 
Competitive concerns over bundled rebates arise when they provide incentives for 
customers to consolidate their purchases with a single provider.  For multi-sided platforms these 
rebate have the same possible procompetitive effects as exclusive dealing.  Instead of requiring a 
customer to consolidate its demand by contract, bundled rebates give the customer a strong financial 
incentive to do so.  
The literature has offered other justifications for bundled rebates based on analyses of 
single-sided firms. These justifications include avoiding double marginalization, reducing 
transactions cost, and various price-discrimination based explanations. These justifications may also 
apply to multi-sided firms.  However, the analysis of whether they increase consumer welfare would 
need to account for the impact of these pricing mechanisms on the demand by the other sides and 
positive feedback effects.28 
Meeting competition clauses are likely to have procompetitive justifications for multi-sided 
platforms beyond those that have been offered for single-sided firms.  Multi-sided platforms use 
complex pricing mechanisms to solve problems resulting from interdependent demand. Particular 
groups of customers create more value for the platform because of their value to other participants.  
Prices and other terms of services are therefore based not just on cost but also on the value of these 
customers to the platform.  These complex pricing arrangements provide an opportunity for rival 
platforms to divert customers by offering better prices.  Meeting competition clauses could reduce 
the risk the platform faces from the loss of critical mass and by reducing that risk encourage the firm 
to make investments in improving the platform in ways that ultimately benefit consumers.  Unlike 
single-sided firms multi-sided platforms cannot avoid the risks of losing customers by charging 
prices equal to marginal costs. Platforms may not be able to reach critical mass with marginal cost 
pricing and in any event marginal cost pricing does not maximize the value of the platform for 
consumers.  
  
 3. Tying and Bundling 
 
The literature has provided a number of explanations for why tying and bundling could 
increase the welfare of the customers who are purchasing the tied or bundled products.29 These 
 
Sided Platforms, 37 RAND J. ECON. 720 (2006) and for an empirical analysis of exclusivity arrangements in this industry 
see Robin S. Lee, Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets (Stern School of Business, Working 
Paper, 2012).  
28 As discussed below, tests that involve examining the incremental profit from bundled rebates would need to 
consider the additional profit realized from positive feedback effects. 
29 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, and A. Jorge Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se 
Illegality, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 287 (2004); David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing 
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005); David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why 
Do Firms Bundle and Tie?, 22 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 37 (2005). 
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explanations apply to the customers of multi-sided platforms as well. 
There is an additional justification for multi-sided platforms. There may be situations in 
which customers on side A benefit when customers of side B are using an additional product or 
service provided by the platform.  For example, an ecommerce platform might require merchants to 
use its payment platform thereby bundling both matchmaking and payment services together.  
Doing so might make it easier for consumers to pay efficiently.  To take another example, a 
newspaper might require consumers to take multiple sections.   That benefits advertisers who obtain 
more inventory for the fixed cost of printing and delivery the paper to the consumer as well as 
additional methods of targeting advertisements based on which consumers read each section.   
  
 4. Behavioral Restrictions and Standards 
 
Multi-sided platforms impose constraints on the behavior of platform participants.30 They 
also sometimes have well-developed governance structures for detecting, adjudicating, and punishing 
violations of platform rules.  Many of these rules appear to be designed to prevent members from 
imposing negative externalities on other members. These rules include ones that encourage platform 
members to provide reliable information, to meet their commitments to trading partners, not to 
engage in various kinds of opportunistic behavior, and other actions that either limit negative 
externalities or increase positive externalities.  For example, eBay imposes a variety of rules on both 
buyers and sellers on its ecommerce platform and can expel customers from the platform that 
violate those rules.31 
In some cases multi-sided platforms impose constraints that reduce the welfare of some 
users but increase the welfare of other users.  Hagiu and Jullien, for example, show that platforms 
sometimes increase the search costs for consumers to benefit merchants.32  Shopping malls, for 
example, are often designed to maximize the foot traffic to stores and in the course of doing so 
increase the time it takes consumers to find and go to a particular store destination.  
Platforms also impose standards on one or both groups of customers.  These could be 
technological standards such as the requirements that payment networks impose on merchants that 
accept their care, standards for presenting information such as those that Facebook imposes through 
its design of its pages, and process standards such as those using by physical exchanges for signaling 
whether an offer has been accepted. 
In some cases competition authorities and courts have argued that some of these behavioral 
restrictions and standards are vertical constraints because they limit the ability of the customers to 
deal with rivals.   The example of payment card systems is instructive. These systems have 
historically had rules that prohibit merchants that have agreed to accept their cards from imposing 
 
30 David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1201 (2012). 
31 For guidance relating to the rules for buyers and sellers on eBay, see Rules & Policies, EBAY, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/overview.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).  
32 For a general analysis of strategies in which platforms increase consumer search costs, see Andrei Hagiu and 
Bruno Jullien, Why do Intermediaries Divert Search?, 42 RAND J. ECON. 337 (2011). 
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surcharges on customers that pay with those cards.  Competition authorities and regulators have 
argued that these no-surcharge rules are anticompetitive because they limit the ability of merchants 
to steer consumers towards competing payment systems.33  
Although the no-surcharge rule may impose costs on some merchants it provides benefits to 
consumers who receive certainty about the prices they will pay when they use their cards. 
Consumers also receive protection against opportunistic behavior by merchants, for example, by 
merchants that assess a surcharge on consumers who do not have an alternative form of payment.  
In fact, while some competition authorities and regulators have banned surcharges other countries 
have passed legislation prohibiting merchants from imposing surcharges.34  There is evidence that 
merchants have in fact used the ability to impose surcharges to engage in price discrimination and 
charge consumers opportunistically.35  
 Of course, whether vertical restraints make platforms more efficient and benefit consumers 
depends on the facts of the particular situation in which these restraints are being used.  The same 
holds true for the anticompetitive effects to which we now turn. 
 
 
33 RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA IV: FINAL REFORMS AND 
REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT 38 (2002), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-system/reforms/cc-
schemes/final-reforms/complete-stmt.pdf;  
34 Countries that ban credit card surcharging include Austria, Fiji, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates. The Price of Paying by Plastic, WHICH? 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2010, at 14, 14, reprinted in Which?, Super-Complaint: Credit and Debit Surcharges 107, submitted to Office 
of Fair Trading (UK) Mar. 30, 2011, available at http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/payment-method-
surcharges-which-super-complaint-249225.pdf; KPMG Fiji Islands, International Executive Alert (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/flash-international-executive-
alert/Documents/flash-international-executive-alert-2012-176-oct.pdf; Credit Card Surcharges Are Unlawful, Says DTI, 
ABS-CBN News, October 17, 2010, available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/10/17/10/credit-card-
surcharges-are-unlawful-says-dti; UAE Bans Credit Card Surcharge from July 1, EMIRATES 24/7, June 6, 2011, available at 
http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-bans-credit-card-surcharge-from-july-1-2011-06-06-1.401405. U.S. 
states that ban credit card surcharges include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New York, Oklahoma, and Texas. Visa Inc., Visa Warns Consumers about Retailer Checkout Fees, 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/using_visa/checkout_fees/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). Countries that limit 
surcharging include Australia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Spain. Which?, supra, at 14. The Reserve Bank 
of Australia recently changed its regulations, allowing the payment card networks to limit surcharging. RESERVE BANK 
OF AUSTRALIA, A VARIATION TO THE SURCHARGING STANDARDS: FINAL REFORMS AND REGULATION IMPACT 
STATEMENT (2012), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-system/reforms/cards/201206-var-surcharging-
stnds-fin-ref-ris/pdf/201206-var-surcharging-stnds-fin-ref-ris.pdf. The European Union is moving toward limiting 
surcharges, and the UK is considering early implementation of this directive. Council Directive 2011/83/EU, 2011 O.J. 
(L 304) 64, 81 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:304:0064:0088:EN:PDF; Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills (UK), Consultation on the Early Implementation of a Ban on Above Cost Payment Surcharges, September 2012, available 
at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/c/12-1008-consultation-ban-above-cost-payment-
surcharges. 
35 Office of Fair Trading, Payment Surcharges (2012), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/super-
complaints/OFT1349resp.pdf; Reserve Bank of Australia, supra note 34, at 4-7. 
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III. ANTICOMPETITVE USE OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS BY MULTI-SIDED 
PLATFORMS 
 
Economists have developed a variety of models that examine the effect of vertical 
restraints.36 These models are typically based on a variety of assumptions that may or may not apply 
in any specific market.  It is well known that the results of these models are sensitive to these 
assumptions. The single-monopoly profit theorem finds that a monopoly cannot obtain an 
additional profit by leveraging its monopoly in one good to a good that is supplied competitively. 
That conclusion strictly holds only when the two goods are consumed in fixed proportion.  
Economists have developed various models of how tying could reduce social welfare when the two 
goods are consumed in fixed proportions.  Those theories find that tying necessarily reduces social 
welfare only under specific assumptions such as the existence of scale economies in the production 
of tied good.37 
The main theoretical models concerning the possible procompetitive and anticompetitive 
uses of vertical restraints assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the businesses considered are single-
sided.   They may provide some insights into possible procompetitive or anticompetitive aspects of 
vertical restraints by multi-sided platforms. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any of the key 
findings of these vertical-constraint theories will necessarily apply to multi-sided platforms that have 
several groups of customers with interdependent demand.  For example, engaging in tying on one 
side of a platform could effect demand on the other sides of platform in a variety of way that are not 
incorporated in the standard theories of tying in the face of fixed or variable proportions. 
A few authors have extended models originally developed to study vertical constraints by 
one-sided firms to consider the effects of those practices or similar ones when engaged in by multi-
sided platforms.  We provide an overview of some of this work and then examine its application to 
considering the anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints.  Like the standard theories, however, 
these theories yield sharp predictions of the effect of vertical restraints on consumer and social 
welfare under very specific and difficult to verify assumptions. 
 
A. TYING AND BUNDLING 
 
Whinston showed that in the presence of scale economies in the market for good B, a 
monopoly seller of good A would, under some conditions, find it profitable to employ tying 
contracts to become a monopolist in the B market.38  He found that whether or not this reduces 
social welfare depends on the details of the situation.  Does this one-sided analysis apply to multi-
sided firms?  Not surprisingly, adding sides adds a layer of complexity. 
Amelio and Jullien consider a two-sided case in which tying is both profitable and increases 
 
36 For a survey see MOTTA, supra note 1.   
37 Evans and Padilla, supra note 29. 
38 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). 
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consumer welfare.39  Suppose the profit-maximizing price on one side of the business is less than 
zero but that it is not feasible actually to charge a negative price.  By bundling another good, 
however, it is possible to make the effective price negative.  They show that this practice increases 
consumer welfare in the monopoly case although it may not increase consumer welfare when there 
is competition.   
Choi presents a model that is designed to capture the facts of an antitrust claim against 
Microsoft.40  The company included Windows Media Player with its Windows software platform.41 
In Choi’s model, two platforms, A and B, link content providers with consumers. Platform A also 
produces a product M, which must be purchased in order to use A or B.  He assumes that content 
providers multi-home, and therefore make their content available on both A and B.  If consumers 
single-home, tying A to M will exclude B but may increase welfare if network effects are strong (so 
there is a large efficiency gain from having more customers on both sides of A) and consumers do 
not consider A and B to be very different (so the reduction in variety from eliminating B is small). If 
consumers also multi-home, however, tying A to M does not exclude B (there are no economies of 
scale), and social welfare is higher necessarily.  This analysis makes clear the importance of 
understanding where multi-homing occurs and, even if it is not observed, why it does not occur. 
Chao and Derdenger investigate mixed bundling which involves selling the products 
individually and together at a discount over the separate prices.42  Consider a monopoly video game 
platform that is considering a mixed bundling strategy: offering a bundle consisting of a console and 
some games as well as selling the console alone and allowing video game developers to sell games by 
themselves.  Ignoring indirect network effects, one would expect that the optimal mixed bundling 
strategy would have higher prices for both the console and games than would be optimal if the 
bundle were not offered, since the bundle enables the firm to segment the market according to the 
number of games they prefer to consumer.  These authors present a model in which network effects 
make it is optimal to reduce both console and game prices if a bundle is offered.  Mixed bundling 
here acts as a price discrimination device, as in one-sided models, and the presence of the bundle 
reduces the cost of cutting console and game prices in order to encourage participation by both 
consumers and developers. 
 
B. EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
 
The Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald were competing newspapers in Dallas, 
Texas. They both obtained content such as columns and comic strips from the Universal Press 
 
39 Andrea Amelio and Bruno Jullien, Tying and Freebies in Two-Sided Markets, 30 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 436 
(2012). 
40 Jay Pil Choi, Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 607 (2010). 
41 European Commission (EC), Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, March 24, 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf; Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla, 
supra note 29. 
42 Yong Chao and Timothy Derdenger, Mixed Bundling in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Evidence 
(University of Louisville and Carnegie Mellon University, Working Paper, 2012).  
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Syndicate. In August 1989 the Morning News signed an exclusive contract with Universal.  The Times 
Herald which subsequently lost readership. It filed an antitrust case, and lost.43  In 1991, the parent 
company of the Morning News bought the Times Herald and shut it down.  Chowdury and Martin use 
this example to motivate their analysis of exclusive dealing contract that deny platform rivals access 
to a key complementary input.  They show that if consumers do not have strong preferences for one 
paper over the other and if fixed costs are substantial, social welfare may be higher with the 
exclusive contract. Consumers are always worse off in this model. 
In the presence of significant economies of scale, Segal and Whinston have demonstrated 
that an incumbent monopoly can profitably deter the entry of a more efficient rival by persuading 
sufficient customers to sign exclusive dealing contracts before the entrant appears.  Doganoglu and 
Wright investigate the effectiveness of this strategy when there are no economies of scale but direct 
or indirect network effects are present.  In the case of a two-sided platform with indirect network 
effects, they find that it is profitable for the incumbent to exclude a more efficient entrant by 
offering attractive exclusive dealing contracts to one side of the market before the entrant appears 
and then charging high prices to those on the other side.  As in the single-sided case with scale 
economies, exclusive dealing deters entry by making it impossible for the potential entrant to obtain 
sufficient customers to be viable. Locking up either side of the market will make it impossible for an 
entrant to obtain customers on the other side. The platform does not have to lock up all of the one 
side for this result—it just needs to lock up enough to prevent profitable entry.  Exclusive dealing 
reduces consumer welfare in this case.  
Both of these analyses focus on the situation in which the platform with the exclusive 
dealing arrangement is an incumbent.  As noted above other authors have shown that exclusive 
dealing arrangements are helpful for platforms to break into a market. Exclusive dealing 
arrangements enable entrants to break competitive-bottleneck equilibria in which customers single 
home on incumbent platforms.  The use of exclusive dealing arrangements to secure critical mass 
raises some complexities for competition policy analysis. A platform may have entered into exclusive 
dealing contracts during the process of dynamic competition. Therefore the grounds for these 
contracts may well have been procompetitive. That leaves an issue of whether it should be allowed 
to maintain these contracts if it becomes the dominant platform.  We discuss that issue in the next 
section. 
 
C.  CONDITIONAL REBATES, MEETING COMPETITION AND OTHER VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
 
The multi-sided platform literature has not analyzes many of the other types of vertical 
restraints.  However, conditional rebates and some other types of vertical restraints could be used to 
raise the cost to customers of either multi-homing with rival platforms or single homing on a rival 
platform.  One might expect that these restraints would have effects similar to exclusive dealing.  
They present the risk that these restraints might deter the profitable entry of a more efficient 
 
43 Times Herald Printing Co. vs. A.H. Belo Corp., No. A14-90-00856-CV (Texas App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 
November 27, 1991). 
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platform or one that is valuable because it is differentiated from the incumbent. 
 
IV. VERTICAL CONSTRAINTS, CRITICAL MASS, AND EXCLUSIONARY 
STRATEGIES 
 
The concern over the anticompetitive use of vertical restraints to prevent rival platforms 
from achieving critical mass is not new.  It was raised in the late 1990s in the antitrust literature 
concerning network industries.44  Carl Shapiro, for example argued that “exclusionary contracts and 
exclusive membership rules can be especially pernicious in network industries, posing a danger that 
new and improved technologies will be unable to gain the critical mass necessary to truly threaten 
the current market leader.”45  The multi-sided platform literature provides a more nuanced and 
richer treatment to the role of exclusive contracts.  In addition to providing a rigorous definition of 
critical mass it provides deeper insights into strategies that multi-sided platforms could use to 
prevent firms from reaching critical mass. However, it also provides additional perspectives on the 
procompetitive use of exclusive dealing contracts by multi-sided platforms.  Finally, it shows that the 
analysis of indirect network effects and critical mass extends well beyond the high-technology 
industries focused on by the network effects literature. 
 
A. CRITICAL MASS 
 
One can think of platform entry and growth as consisting of two phases.46 In the first 
“initiation” phase the platform develops a critical mass of users.  In the second “growth” phase the 
platform relies on network effects to drive growth to a long-run equilibrium level that is determined 
by the profit-maximizing size of the platform given the state of competition, and product 
differentiation, in the industry.47 
Critical mass is the border between the initiation and the growth phase.  Critical mass is the 
amount of demand on both sides that is sufficient to generate positive feedback effects.  Once 
critical mass is reached an additional fully informed user on side gets value from the platform, 
increases the value of the platform, and makes the platform attractive to an additional fully informed 
user on the other side.  The positive-feedback effect process continues until the platform reaches its 
long-run equilibrium size. 
The notion of critical mass for platforms is similar to the well-known issue of liquidity in 
trading environments.48  A trading venue is viable only if there is a sufficient volume of bids and asks 
 
44 Balto, supra note 7; Shapiro, supra note 7. 
45 Shapiro, supra note 7, at 674.   
46 Evans and Schmalensee, supra note 10. 
47 As noted earlier, temporally these two phases could collapse into a single point in time when the platform has 
secured commitments from a critical mass of customers and in effect opens for business at that point in time. 
48 In fact critical mass for a trading environment corresponds to minimum liquidity.  For a discussion of liquidity 
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for trading to occur and therefore for both liquidity providers and liquidity takers to incur the 
expense of coming to the trading platform. If there is too little liquidity buyers and sellers will not 
come to the platform. It there is enough liquidity more buyers and sellers will come and the platform 
will in fact grow and the platform will be attractive to market specialists and other liquidity 
providers. 
During the initiation phase the platform engages in strategies to reach critical mass.  From 
the standpoint of formal economics this is, for now, a block box.  In practice, platforms use a 
combination of securing the participation of early adopters who like trying new things, trying to get 
users who place particularly high value on the platform, promotional offers, securing marquee 
customers who are particularly attractive to the other side, and aggressive marketing and promotion 
to get word of mouth.  They also may engage in a variety of communications to shape the 
expectations of users that they are likely to achieve critical mass which that provide these users with 
value. 
Based on casual evidence it appears that most new platforms do not make it through this 
initiation phase.49  They never achieve critical mass and die.  The economics of critical mass explains 
what happens.  Platforms that cannot achieve critical mass do not get to the point where there are 
self-perpetuating positive feedback effects. Instead, customers that have joined the platform on one 
side realize from experience that the platform does not have enough customers on the other side to 
make participation in the platform worth their while.  Early adopters, high-valued users, and people 
who expected that the platform would achieve critical mass therefore abandon the platform.  
Growth towards critical mass slows and eventually reverses itself as platform participants abandon it.  
Although the economic models do not make it possible to put a time frame on the initiation phase it 
is obvious that it is limited.  The customers that join during the initiation phase will only give the 
platform so much time before they abandon it. 
Entering into exclusive dealing contracts is one of the strategies that platforms would want 
to consider during this initiation phase.  These contracts enable the platform guarantee participation 
one side of the platform. That demand attracts members on the other side since participation in the 
platform is the only way for members on the other side to access these customers.    
 
 
B. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND THE PLATFORM INITIATION PHASE  
 
 Incumbent platforms could adopt strategies that make it difficult for new platforms to reach 
critical mass during the initiation phase.  Entrants would fail. Moreover, knowledge of these 
strategies, together with perhaps observing past failures, could dissuade other firms from entering 
and from investors funding startups in this area. Incumbent platforms could use vertical restraints to 
 
and critical mass see Larry Harris, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 
(2002); Maureen O’Hara, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY (1995). 
49 Of course it is well known that most entrepreneurs fail even in single-sided businesses.  Critical mass is just 
another hurdle in multi-sided platform businesses. 
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make it difficult for new platforms to attain critical mass.50 
 Vertical restraints could discourage customers from multi-homing in favor of single homing 
on the incumbent platform that has imposed the vertical restraints.  Vertical restraints could also 
discourage customers from abandoning the incumbent platform altogether and single homing on a 
rival platform. 
Exclusive dealing contracts could prevent new platforms from obtaining enough members 
on either side to attain critical mass. Platforms could enter into agreements that preclude customers 
from also participating in another platform. Conditional rebates and meeting competition clauses 
could accomplish the same result less directly. Conditional rebates would provide financial 
disincentives to reduce volume and in the extreme case could make it uneconomic to move modest 
portions of volume to a rival platform. Meeting competition clauses on the other hand would give 
the incumbent platform the opportunity to beat the rival’s terms. 
Vertical restraints would not need to foreclose the new platform from all demand on either 
side.  It just needs to prevent the new platform from securing enough demand to reach critical mass.  
Figure 2 outlines the typical situation for platforms. Vertical restraints would prevent a platform 
from reaching critical mass if these restraints prevented the platform from attaining enough demand 
on any side—that is more than b’ on side B or more than a’ on side A.  Vertical restraints would 
also prevent a platform from reaching critical mass if these restraints prevented the platform from 
attaining any more combination of demand shown by the shaded area in the cone to the southwest 
of the critical mass frontier.  
The greatest obstacle for a new platform that is trying to secure critical mass is being 
prevented from pursuing the various strategies that would be most helpful in getting to critical mass.  
Therefore if particular groups or constellations of customers would be useful in getting to critical 
 
50 They could also engage in predation which we do not discuss here. 
Figure 2: Critical Mass and Entry Deterrence 
Side A 
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mass during the initiation phase vertical restraints that prevent those particular groups from joining 
the new platform would be most effective. Those could be marquis customers.  Similarly, if a new 
platform would consider entering into exclusive deals with some set of customers vertical restraints 
that prevent or deter those customers from doing so would be most damaging to the new platform. 
In both cases it is possible that the vertical restraints could deter the entrant from attaining 
critical mass by preventing the entrant from securing enough demand on any side.  An incumbent 
platform could, for example, enter into exclusive contracts with “enough” of the potential members 
of one side of a platform. Platforms typically have a side that is more valuable and this is the side 
that is usually charged to a lower price.  Locking up demand on that side would appear to be the 
most effective way to block an entrant.  An incumbent platform could take a different approach. 
There may be situations in which groups of customers on various sides account for a 
disproportionate share of positive feedback effects. These are the most valuable customer segments 
for the platform.  The platform could try to lock up as many of these key customer groups as 
possible through a variety of contracts. 
Entrants are obvious targets because they cannot survive, let alone grow, if they do not 
achieve critical mass.  However, it is possible for incumbents to employ tactics that could drive other 
incumbents, who already exceed critical mass, out of business. A particular target could be platforms 
that have surpassed critical mass and are in their growth phase towards their long-run equilibrium 
size. Let us refer to the incumbent that employs the strategy the predator and the rival the prey.  The 
predator could enter into vertical restraints with its customers to deter them from working with a 
rival and then poach enough customers from its rival—possibly at terms that would be unprofitable 
for the rival—to drive the prey below critical mass. 
 
C. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND EXCLUSIONARY STRATEGIES 
 
The older network effects literature often assumed that direct or indirect network effects 
would lead one firm to capture the market as a result of efficiency, luck, or anticompetitive 
strategies. Looking across the wide variety of industries with multi-sided platforms, all of which have 
indirect network effects to varying degrees, the empirical evidence does not support that concern. 
As noted earlier most industries that have multi-sided platforms appear to evolve to a situation in 
which several platforms compete with each other for customers. Product differentiation is one of 
the likely reasons for the ability of several platforms to compete with each other despite having 
much in common in what they are doing.51 
We would expect that businesses that want to compete with existing platforms would try to 
differentiate their platform.  That makes sense for two related reasons. The first is that a new 
platform would have trouble competing with an existing platform if it was truly a copycat.52  The 
existing platform would provide more value to users because it has both sides on side and has gotten 
critical mass. Although the new platform could engage in price competition at similar prices the 
 
51 The existence of congestion and diseconomies of scale in costs are other reasons. 
52 Although as noted above congestion and diseconomies of scale could provide room for entry.  
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incumbent platform would always be better.   The second reason, though, is that by differentiating 
itself a new platform would have an easier time achieving critical mass.  It would be able to attract 
early adopters and high value users who are particularly attracted to its differentiated service.  It 
would also be able to enter into exclusive deals at a lower cost since it would not necessarily be 
competing to the same desirable customers as the incumbent platform. 
The older network effects literature expressed significant concern that networks could 
engage in exclusionary strategies, especially exclusive dealing contracts, to prevent entrants from 
challenging them.  They would therefore be able to attain secure monopoly positions.  The existence 
of product differentiation tempers the concern in two ways.  First, as an empirical matter it does not 
appear that incumbent platforms have in fact kept out competition in most multi-sided platform 
industries.  Second, product differentiation appears to be a useful counterstrategy to vertical restraint 
strategies deployed by incumbents. 
 
D.  PROCOMPETITIVE VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
The fact that an incumbent platform has vertical restraints and that these vertical restraints 
make it harder for an entrant to achieve critical mass does not necessarily mean that these restraints 
are anticompetitive.  The incumbent platform may have adopted these restraints to achieve 
efficiencies that benefit consumers. These benefits may outweigh the harm that consumer incur 
from deterring entry and growth of new platforms.  We return to our discussion of the 
procompetitive us of vertical restraints in light of the analysis of critical mass. 
 
 1. Vertical Restraints and Static Efficiencies 
Vertical restraints including exclusive dealing contracts could be used by the platform to 
ensure that it retains critical mass in the face of competition.  In some cases the platform may have 
adopted exclusive dealing during its initiation phase and continued these after it achieved critical 
mass and reached long-run equilibrium. But it may continue these contracts because dropping them 
would raise the risk of those customers being lured to other platforms that offer exclusive deals.  In 
other cases it might adopt new exclusive dealing contracts to reduce the risk of losing sufficient 
demand to attract the other side.  Either way, if a sufficient number of customers left the platform 
could see positive feedback effects work in reverse and it could fall below the level necessary for 
critical mass. 
It is also possible that some customers on one side use their value to the platform to 
threaten to go to another platform in the absence of price or other concessions.  The obvious 
bargain to strike with such customers is one in which the platform provides low prices, or subsidies, 
in return for a commitment on the part of these customers to make themselves available exclusively 
to the customers on the platform or not to pay higher prices to other platforms. As Armstrong and 
Wright point it is the customers that comprise the competitive bottleneck that may ultimately benefit 
from exclusive dealing. 
Customers on the opposite side of the customers who have an exclusive contract may 
benefit from these exclusive dealing contracts as well.  These customers have a guarantee that certain 
counterparties they would like to interact with will be available on the platform.  That increases the 
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expected thickness of the market they will have available to them on the platform. It also enables 
them to reduce the costs of searching for these potential counterparties to trades on other platforms.  
Customers can avoid some of the costs of Multihoming.  Customers on the same side as the 
customers who have exclusive contracts may benefits from these contracts as well.  They know that 
the customers with exclusive contracts will attract customers on the other side and they will 
therefore be able to interact with those customers.  A useful example is a dating venue.  It is 
common for nightclubs to recruit “cool” people to ignite their venues.  The presence of the “cool” 
guys attracts women with whom both the cool and uncool guys can then interact with. 
Generally, as mentioned earlier, vertical restraints could be natural elements of the strategies 
that platforms adopt to manage the positive and negative externalities that ultimately determine the 
value of the platform to the customers on the several sides.  
 2.Vertical Restraints and Dynamic Efficiencies 
Multi-sided platforms face the same risks that all businesses do in entering a new category.  
Especially if they are the initial innovator they face uncertainty over whether there is sufficient 
demand to create a viable business and whether more efficient competitors will appear that will 
destroy their investment value.  They have to incur the risks inherent in discovering demand and 
learning how to design an efficient and profitable business.  But in addition multi-sided platforms 
face considerable risks in whether they will be able to secure critical mass. That is especially the case 
for platforms that must have both sides on board simultaneously. They have a limited time to do get 
to critical mass.  Their primary challenge is they are necessarily offering a service that is probably not 
valuable in its early stages to customers simply because there are not enough customers on board the 
platform early on.  That is very unlike the startup phase for single-sided businesses that generally 
start with a product or service that is valued by consumers. 
Building up critical mass means assembling groups of customers that together create value to 
ignite positive feedback effects.  A platform that does this successfully may provide something of a 
roadmap to other potential platform competitors.  These rivals could free ride on the platform’s 
success in identifying the right types of customers to get on its platform during the initiation phase.  
Vertical restraints could be used to make it harder for competitors to free ride in this way.  The 
benefits and costs of allowing a platform to protect the customer base it has assembled are similar to 
other kinds of intellectual property.  The benefits result from providing incentives to develop 
innovative solutions to securing critical mass and ignition for a new platform business and 
discouraging free riding that could reduce if not eliminate those incentives. The costs result from the 
increased market power that a successful platform entrant would then as a result of being able to 
discourage rivals. 
 
 3. Vertical Restraints During Common Initiation and Growth Phases 
 
The multi-sided platform literature shows that as a matter of theory exclusive dealing contracts 
are helpful for entrants to break competitive bottleneck equilibria.  Empirical result has documented 
that these contracts were valuable for entrants in the video game console industry.  The contracts 
also have a number of other benefits in terms of helping platforms build critical mass as we have 
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discussed.  It is therefore not surprising to see these contracts and similar vertical restraints that bind 
customers being used by multi-sided platforms. 
Assessing whether these arrangements are anti- or procompetitive is a particularly difficult 
exercise during the startup phase of an industry.  During this period many multi-sided platforms may 
be entering and going through initiation and growth phases. Long run equilibrium for any of them 
may be a ways off.  Unfortunately, competition authorities and courts do not necessarily know 
which stage the industry is in. The leading firm may be at an early stage in growth and not that far 
away from the critical mass boundary.  A better-financed firm may be at the critical mass phase.  It is 
far from clear that intervention in these circumstances to prohibit exclusive contracts by the leading 
firm would result in the industry moving to a long run equilibrium that is superior for consumers.  
That could destabilize the leading firm while giving the entrant an artificial advantage. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This review of vertical restraints by multi-sided platforms has identified several aspects of 
these platforms that competition analysis should take into account to assess the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive aspects of these restraints.   
First, where the platform is in its life cycle and where the platform and its rivals are in the 
lifecycle of the industry are important considerations. Exclusive dealing and other similar vertical 
restraints that bind customers to the platform are more likely to be procompetitive practices, or at 
least the residue of procompetitive strategies, during the initiation and early growth stages of 
platforms are during the early parts of the lifecycle of platform industries.  This point argues for 
avoiding antitrust interventions during the early years of an industry. 
Second, in assessing whether vertical restraints on one side of a platform generate 
efficiencies it is important to look at the impact of these restraints on the other sides of the 
platform.  These restraints could provide customers on the other side with the benefits of knowing 
that particular kinds of customers they want to interact with are available on the other side.  They 
could also provide various other benefits as we saw when customers on one side benefit from the 
customers on the other side having a tied product. 
Third, in assessing whether there are procompetitive benefits of vertical restraints it is 
important to consider their role in harnessing positive and negative externalities in ways that increase 
platform value.  Vertical restraints could help increase positive network effects and also limit 
customers on one side from engaging in behavior that harms customers on the other side. 
Fourth, in assessing whether vertical restraints could foreclose a rival it is important to assess 
the impact of the restraints on the ability of the rival to reach critical mass.  That will ordinarily 
involve examining the types of customers that are foreclosed to the rival, their positive externalities 
with customers on the other side of the platform, and their overall importance in moving the 
platform to critical mass.   
Fifth, one cannot take the implications of formal economic models of anticompetitive 
restraints that were developed for traditional industries and assume that these implications apply to 
multi-sided platforms. The only reliable way to assess whether they do nor not is to incorporate 
interdependent demand in these models and assess whether the implications are robust to that 
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change.  
Sixth, the literature on multi-sided platforms is relatively new as is the experience of courts 
and competition authorities in analyzing their practices using the lens of this new theory.  Over time 
we would expect that developments in economics, both theory and empirics, and the experience 
with cases will find that multi-sided platforms can engage in anticompetitive strategies we have not 
yet identified and that some strategies that appear anticompetitive today will turn out be benign. 
So, one can be sure that this paper is not the last word on the subject. 
    
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
